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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW - Validity of a Criminal Conviction in
Absence of Counsel. - Defendant was charged with bur-
glary, and counsel for his defense was appointed by the Su-
perior Court of Delaware. Several days thereafter the defen-
dant informed, the court of his decision to employ his own
attorney, and directed the judge to dismiss the appointed
counsel. Consequently, counsel was discharged, and the defen-
dant was informed that no new appointment would be forth-
coming-except by request. No attorney was employed by the
defendant however, and no request was made to the court for
a subsequent appointment. The jury trial was conducted
without7 an attorney for the defense. Care was exercised by
the judge to insure the defendant a fair trial, and every effort
was, made to inform him of the nature of the proceedings. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty and thereafter the court in-
formed the defendant of his right to file motion for a new
trial. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Where the defendant is
given ample opportunity to avail himself of counsel but fails
tor do so, and the trial is-not unfair, there is no reason to set
aside the conviction. Draper v. State, 166, A. 2d 217 (Del,
1961).
Originally in England a -person charged with treason or
felony was not permitted the services of an attorney. How-
ever,, parties in civil cases or those accused of misdemeanors
were entitled to full assistance of counsel. The rule was abol-
ished as to treason in 1688 but no right to counsel in a felony
was allowed until 1836, when it was granted by an act of Par-
liament. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158
(1932). The value of counsel in the promotion of justice was
held in -such high esteem in the newly created United States
that the, right to be represented was firmly embedded in its
Constitution, and applied to federal cases. U. S. CONST,
amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court held that de-
nial of counsel in state courts, where a capital offense is in-
volved, may be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
"due process clause." Powell v. Alabama,, supra; Adams v.
Rager, 172 F. 2d 693 (7th Cir. 1949). Consequently, all states.
have provided either by statute or constitution for appoint-
ment of counsel to indigent accused in capital cases, and a
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majority of states have extended this appointment to lesser
offenses; Alabama, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,
and South Caxolina were not included in this group. 30 Miss.
L.J. 319 (1959). Regardless of statutory provisions, the
United States Supreme Court has required the state to ap-
point an attorney in cases where the circumstances of the pro-
ceedings were so complex that a fair trail for the defendant
was impossible in absence of counsel. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S.
786, 89 L. Ed. 1367 (1945). The failure of the court to pro-
tect the defendant's interest in absence of counsel has been
ruled a violation of due process. Gibbs v. Burk, 337 U. S. 773,
93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949). The defendant may expressly or im-
pliedly waive his right to counsel, Bowman v. Alvis, 88 Ohio
App. 229, 96 N. E. 2d 605 (1950); In re Bunson, 152 Ohio
St. 375, 89 N. E. 2d 651 (1949), and it has been held that if
not claimed, this right is waived. People v. Burnett, 407 Ill.
269, 95 N. E. 2d 319 (1950) ; People v. Reese, 410 Ill. 11, 100
N. E. 2d 907 (1951). The trial court may offer counsel, and
if declined by defendant, the trial may proceed without
jeopardizing the validity of a subsequent conviction. State v.
Hamilton, 163 La. 389, 111 So. 795 (1927). The defendant
may decline a court-appointed counsel and obtain his own
attorney, but this must be done seasonably. People v. Zucker,
2 Cal. 112, - P. 2d - (1960). Therefore, if he fails to secure
counsel, and is subsequently convicted, this is no ground for
reversal. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S. E. 2d
670 (1940) ; Draper v. State, supra.
In view of the development of the law concerning the right
of the accused to be represented by counsel, it would seem
that the Delaware court exercised sound legal judgment in
finding that there was no error in the Draper case. The de-
fendant was given the benefit of an appointed attorney, but
apparently had no desire to avail himself of this right. His
request that he be allowed to obtain his own lawyer was
honored, but not seasonably exercised. Under these circum-
stances the court was not in error in proceeding with the
trial. There are no facts to indicate unfair treatment of the
defendant in absence of an attorney, and no evidence that
during the trial defendant objected to the lack of counsel.
The defendant's position is reflected in a statement borrowed
from an old saw: "A horse led to water should not complain
if he does not drink." HARRY L. EDWARDS.
[Vol. 14
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Eminent Domain - Power
to Condemn Private Property for Resale to Private Enter-
prise. - Pursuant to authorization by the Colorado Urban
Renewal Act, the Denver Urban Renewal Authority proposed
to acquire a substantial part of the properties within a pro-
ject area by either purchase or condemnation, and thereafter,
to sell a majority of the properties to private enterprises.
Plaintiff, a property owner in the project area attempted to
enjoin the Renewal Authority from proceeding with the pro-
ject, attacking the act on the grounds that it violated the
Colorado constitution. Plaintiff's preliminary motions were
refused. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The Urban Renewal
Act was not in violation of the state constitution, the taking
being for public use. Rabinoff v. District Court, 358 P. 2d 879
(Colo. 1961).
It is a universally established rule that private property
cannot be taken by eminent domain except for public use. Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954) ; United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welsh, 327 U. S. 546, 90 L. Ed. 843
(1946). Originally, to constitute a public use there had to be
more than a mere benefit from the contemplated improve-
ment; the public had to be entitled to use or enjoy the prop-
erty by right. Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 204 Ill. 576, 68 N. E.
522 (1903); NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 430 (3d ed. 1950).
Thus, the terms "public use," itpublic purpose," and "public
benefit" were not considered synonymous. Edens v. City of
Columbia, 228 S. C. 563, 91 S. E. 2d 280 (1956) ; Bookhart v.
Cent. Elec. Power Corp., 219 S. C. 414, 65 S. E. 2d 781
(1951). Yet, under early decisions, the acquiring of slum
areas, accompanied by the erection of low-income housing de-
velopments, was held to be a public use. Zurn v. Chicago, 389
Ill. 114, 59 N. E. 2d 18 (1,45) ; New York Housing Authority
v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. 2d 153 (1936). Residential
slum clearance, as a distinct and separate act, has been held
to be a public use in itself. Papadinis v. City of Somerville,
331 Mass. 627, 121 N. E. 2d 714 (1954) ; Foeller v. Housing
Authority, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P. 2d 752 (1953). Some courts
have said that the use of eminent domain under urban re-
newal statutes was strictly limited to slum areas. Crommett
v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A. 2d 814 (1954) ; Bris-
tol Redev. & Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93
S. E. 2d 288 (1956). However, others have decreed that prop-
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erty may be taken by eminent domain for purposes other than
slum clearance, provided that a compelling economic commun-
ity need is being met. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164
1.. S. 112, 41 L. Ed. 369 (1896) ; Oliver v. Clairton, 374 Pa.,
333,, 98 A. 2d 47 (1953). Unimproved land and structures
that are not substandard have been taken, in an area of slum,
for public use; Ghold Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135,
104,A. 2d 365 (1954), and public use has also been found to
exist in the taking of so called vacant blighted areas-areas
w~ich, because of unpaid taxes, outdated zoning or inadequate
community planning were standing idle. People ex rel. Gut-
71necht v. City of Chicago, 4'14 Ill. 600, 111 N. E. 2d 826
(0453). Since the acquisition of areas found to be detrimen-
tal to the public welfare was a proper public purpose, Her-
znger v. Mayor & City Council, 203 Md. 49, 98 A. 2d 87
(1953), it follows that only the taking of the property, as dis-
tinguished from the subsequent use, need be in the public in-
terest in order to constitute a public use. Peopla ex rel.
Adarnowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'in, 150 N. E.
2d 792 (Ill. 1958) ; Schenck v. City of Pittsburg, 364 Pa. 31,
70, A; 2d 612 (1950). Only one state, South Carolina, con-
tinues to subscribe to the narrow concept of public use and
has refused to permit the acquisition of blighted areas if they
were to be resold to private enterprises. Edens v. City of
'Columbia, supra; Riley v. Clarleston Union Station Co., 71
S. C. 454, 51 S. E. 2d 485 (1904).
The instant case agrees with the majority of the decisions
in other jurisdictions and evidences the fact that absent pri-
vate financial investments and the use of public ,powers of
eminent domain that are contemplated by the urban rede-
velopment acts, slum and blight areas 'will not be cleared and
returned to a socially useful role. The use of local police pow-
ers or private enterprise alone cannot effectively accomplish
a ,program of blight clearance and redevelopment. Tradi-
tional notions of land use and development, as well as judi-
cial precedent, support the concept of redevelopment by pri-
vate enterprise of slum and blight areas that have been con-
demned and cleared by local public authorities. Remembering
that this redevelopment is subject to rigid public control, it
may be regarded as a proper instrument for the implemen-
tation of the public aims and uses envisaged in the urban
redevelopment program. Since its one major purpose is the
146 [Vol, 14
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elimination and rehabilitation of the blighted sections of
municipalities, urban renewal certainly falls within any con-
ception of public use, for nothing can be more beneficial to
a commuhity as a whole than slum clearance, public health,
public safety, prevention of crime and juvenile delinquency.
There is no apparent reason, therefore, why progress in the
execution of this program should be impeded by adverse
judgments as to its constitutionality, since the objectives of
urban redevelopment are tailored exclusively for public use.
WILLIAM B. ENDICTOR.
TORTS - Survival Statute - Funeral Expenses Not
CoIlectible. - The administrator of the decedent's estate
brought an action under the Survival Statute to recover for
conscious suffering, and medical and funeral expenses of the
deceased. Defendant made a motion to strike the word "fu-
neral" from the complaint. The trial judge granted the mo-
tion and the plaintiff objected and subsequently appealed.
HELD: Affirmed. Funeral expenses were not recoverable
under the Survival Statute. Gowan v. Thomas, 237 S. C. 223,
116 S. E. 2d 761 (1960).
The rule at common law that an action in tort dies with
the deceased, Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep.
1033 (N. P. 1808), was changed in England by Lord Camp-
bell's Act in 1846. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c.
93. However, the English have not allowed recovery for fu-
neral expenses under their act as there was no expressed pro-
vision in the act which would modify the common law. Dalton
-v. South Eastern Ry., 4 C. B. (n. s.) 296, 140 Eng. Rep. 1098
(C. P. 1858) ; Clarlk v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., (1906) 2
K. B. 648. One interesting view in America is that death is
inevitable and the wrongdoer merely advances the time for
payment of the funeral expenses and is not liable therefor.
Bradley v. Haw, 187 Iowa 501, 174 N. W. 331 (1919) ; Florida
E. C. Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914). However,
this view is not in accord with the greater weight of authority
and is not the law in South Carolina. Tollerson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 188 S. C. 67, 198 S. E. 164 (1936) ; Petrie v.
Columbia & G. R. R., 29 S. C. 303, 7 S. E. 515 (1887). Stat-
utes in the United States, patterned after Lord Campbell's
1961,1 -
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Act, vary widely; and South Carolina has both a Survival
Act, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 10-209 (1952) and
a Wrongful Death Act, CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA,
§ 10-1951 (1952). The two statutes provide for two entirely
different causes of action and cannot be joined in the same
suit. Grainger v. Greenville S. & A. Ry., 101 S. C. 399, 85 S. E.
968 (1915) ; Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 97
S. C. 27, 81 S. E. 189 (1913). However, there is authority to
the effect that the two actions should be permitted to be
joined in the same suit. Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 102
Wis. 137, 78 N. W. 771 (1899). Under the Survival Act, the
administrator sues in behalf of the estate of the deceased for
damages done to the deceased before death; however, under
the Wrongful Death Act the suit is brought for the direct
benefit of the statutory beneficiaries for damages done to
them by the wrongful death of the deceased. In re Estate
Mayo, 60 S. C. 401, 38 S. E. 634 (1901); St. Louis & S. F.
R. R. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac. 1185 (1914). The Sur-
vival Act permits survival of those actions that the deceased
could have brought during his lifetime against the tortfeasor.
Claussen v. Brothers, 148 S. C. 1, 145 S. E. 539 (1928);
Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio 395, 83 N. E.
501 (1907). Naturally, the deceased cannot sue for his own
funeral expenses before he dies. The Wrongful Death Act has
been interpreted to include funeral expenses where they have
been paid by the beneficiary. Petrie v. Columbia & G. R. Co.,
supra; Tollerson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., supra. Under
a similar statute it has been held that payment was not nec-
essary as long as the beneficiary was obligated to pay. Wy-
land v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 285 Pac. 676
(1930); Thompson v. Cooper, 192 Okla. 240, 135 P. 2d 52
(1943). In South Carolina, the estate is primarily liable for
the funeral expenses of the deceased. Waters v. Register, 76
S. C. 132, 56 S. E. 849 (1907) ; Mease v. Wagner, 1 McCord
395 (1821) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 198 S. C. 526, 18 S. E. 2d
450 (1941). However, South Carolina provides for recov-
ery by the statutory beneficiaries, Petrie v. Columbia &
G. R. R. Co., supra, and leaves the estate without a cause of
action by refusing to allow recovery of funeral expenses un-
der the Survival Act. Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire
Dept., 368 Pa. 235, 81 A. 865 (1951) ; Spillman v. Weimaster,
275 Mich. 93, 265 N. W. 787 (1936).
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Notwithstanding that the estate, and not the statutory
beneficiaries, is primarily liable for the funeral expenses of
the deceased, this decision has left the estate without a re-
medy against the tortfeasor for funeral expenses. The Court
following a prior interpretation of the survival statute, said
that the estate could collect only such damages as the deceased
could have collected had he lived; however, the question of the
collectibility of funeral expenses was not before the Court in
the Claussen, case and, although the interpretation was per-
suasive, it should not have been controlling in this case.
Where the statutory beneficiaries have paid the funeral ex-
penses, South Carolina has allowed them to recover said ex-
penses, under the Wrongful Death Act, and no fault can be
found with this proposition of law. However, it is conceivable
that a deceased person may leave an estate and not leave any
statutory beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act. Under
such circumstances there is no way provided, under the pre-
sent state of the law in South Carolina, for the funeral ex-
penses to be collected from the tortfeasor. The Court wisely
pointed out that the tortfeasor should not have to pay double
funeral expenses (once under the Survival Act and once un-
der the Wrongful Death Act). Therefore, if the statutory
beneficiaries have paid or obligated themselves to pay, a re-
covery for funeral expenses from the tortfeasor by them
should bar recovery for the same expenses by the estate. Con-
versely, if the estate were allowed to recover the funeral ex-
penses, the statutory beneficiaries should be barred from a
like recovery. The estate should be granted by the legislature
the right to recover, thereby allowing the estate or the stat-
utory beneficiaries (depending upon which is out of pocket
for the funeral expenses) to recover the same from the tort-
feasor. It is interesting to note that there is now pending a
bill in the South Carolina legislature to allow recovery of
funeral expenses under the Survival Statute. H. 1212, 94th
Gen. Assembly 1st Sess. (1961). Said bill has been passed by
the House and is now in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
JAMES 0. DUNN.
1961]
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